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Results-orientation, impact assessment, and value  
for money have been creating a growing buzz in the 
fields of international cooperation and peacebuilding 
for the last few years. But what are the consequences 
of an increased focus on results for practice? 
 
 Drawing on expert debates at two workshops 
jointly organized by FriEnt - Working Group on Peace 
and Development and the Center for Peacebuilding 
(KOFF) at swisspeace that took place in May 2012 in 
Bonn and Berne, this working paper argues that 
results-orientation in its currently practiced form is 
more of a hindrance than a help for achieving better 
results. Methodological and organizational responses 
to make interventions in conflict-affected contexts 
more focused on results are often poorly adapted to 
grapple with the complexity of these environments.  
An excessive emphasis on ‘upward accountability’ puts 
at risk the learning function of evaluation processes 
and testifies to the common power hierarchies in the 
international aid system. Against this backdrop, this 
working paper argues that a more thorough application 
of standards of good practice in this field, more 
experimentation with alternative methods, and the 
creation of learning spaces outside of institutionalized 
processes can offer entry points to make results-
orientation a more meaningful endeavor.
Abstract
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Introduction
Results-orientation, impact assessment, value for money, and similar expres-
sions have been creating a growing buzz in the fields of international cooper-
ation and peacebuilding for the last few years. Almost unanimously, actors 
from these fields emphasize their commitment to manage and monitor for 
results, focus on impact, and keep an eye on efficiency. Results-orientation 
has become a reality in the field of international cooperation to which all 
actors have to adapt. Standards are set, principles are fixed, and no strategy 
is written without using the words ‘results’ or ‘effectiveness’.1 
 
 Most practitioners would acknowledge that having a clearer idea about 
the results achieved by their interventions is a helpful thing. Not least because 
a number of evaluations have concluded that current programming practice in 
conflict-affected contexts suffers from several shortcomings. In addition, 
organizations continue to argue that measuring impact or effectiveness in 
their particular thematic areas or difficult working contexts creates consid-
erable conceptual and practical challenges, and that current accountability 
practices can be more problematic than useful. Finding ways to strengthen 
results-orientation taking into consideration the differing needs of donors, 
implementing and local organizations, and of the people living in these situa-
tions have therefore proven to be a challenging tasks.
 This working paper critically appraises the way in which results-orien-
tation is currently understood and practiced in international cooperation and 
peacebuilding in conflict-affected contexts; but also to highlight prospects for 
improving current practice. For this aim, it draws on the content of two inter-
national workshops that took place in May 2012 in Bonn and Bern. Jointly 
organized by FriEnt - Working Group on Peace and Development and the 
Center for Peacebuilding (KOFF) at swisspeace, these workshops featured 
experts’ inputs on methods for design, monitoring and evaluation (DM&E) of 
projects, institutional learning, and related topics, as well as debates among 
practitioners from these fields.2
 1 As an illustration, the strategic message 
on Switzerland’s international coopera-
tion in 2013-2016 cites the word ‘results’ 
93 times, ‘efficient’ or ‘efficiency’ 135 
times, while the word ‘peace’ is only used 
33 times.
2 If direct quotation marks are used, they 
cite a statement of an expert in one of 
these two workshops. For reasons of  
anonymity, these quotes are not  
attributed to people.
72.1  Conflict-affected situations
 
Most conventional approaches to planning and program management  
work best in the environment that they have been developed for. Such tools 
often assume a relatively stable environment, a limited number of differing 
perspectives and interpretations, and a relative certainty of what the 
problems are and the strategies that can help in addressing them. In environ-
ments where these assumptions hold, they go largely unnoticed. But in 
conflict-affected contexts it becomes clear that these assumptions may 
constitute obstacles to a meaningful use of these tools.
 Conflict-affected contexts are highly dynamic, complex and inter-
connected, influenced by a multitude of mutually interdependent factors, and 
therefore highly unpredictable.3 Social change processes are non-linear, but 
happen in equally unpredictable, interconnected and complex ways. How, 
then, can conventional program management approaches that rely on the 
quite linear Input-Output-Outcome-Impact logic be usefully applied to 
complex environments? If one takes complexity seriously, a linear influence of 
a program on the situation it wants to change might be more of an exception 
than the rule. 
 Furthermore, each context is unique and develops in its own, unique 
ways. This means that the applicability of ‘best practices’ is very limited. 
There is a considerable likelihood that what worked in one context will fail or 
yield different results in another context – or even in the ‘same’ context at a 
different point in time. Dynamic, complex and unpredictable contexts 
therefore require interventions which are thoroughly tailor-made. 
 Finally, the problem of unintended negative effects caused by the 
intervention of international actors in a conflict-affected context has to be 
considered. If one starts from the assumption that organizations only partially 
understand the context in which they intervene, the risk of unintentionally 
doing harm is acute in highly dynamic contexts.4 The OECD/DAC therefore 
gives this issue a high priority. Their Fragile States Principle Nr.2 that also 
pertains to conflict-affected areas reads: ‘Ensure all activities do no harm’.5 
3 Ramalingam, Jones, Reba,  
and Young (2008)
4 See, for instance, Anderson (1999),  
or Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (2012)
5 OECD (2007)
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2.2 Results-orientation in peacebuilding
 
The particular thematic field of ‘peacebuilding’ adds additional challenges to 
results-orientation. As mentioned above, showing or even proving results in 
peacebuilding is not a straightforward endeavor. In particular peacebuilding 
results can in most cases not easily be quantified. While this also applies to 
many development interventions, especially in conflict-affected contexts, e.g. 
governance projects, this challenge is even more pronounced in peacebuilding 
where working on the improvement of relationships, on the legitimacy of 
institutions, or changing mindsets is often the central concern. All these areas 
elude easy quantification or even indicator identification.
 Secondly, peacebuilding interventions are inherently political, taking 
place in contexts where important stakeholder groups disagree on key socio-
political issues and where multiple perspectives exist on important questions 
like ‘what is the problem’, hat are the key priorities’, or ‘how do we solve this’. 
This means that peacebuilding results are subjected to an equally political /
politicized validation by local and international stakeholders, as such eluding 
technocratic procedures of ‘result measurement’. 
 Additionally, peacebuilding as a field is facing methodological evalu-
ation challenges. While the non-linear evolution of conflict-affected contexts 
and the large number of contributing factors is also challenging the evaluation 
of development interventions, this challenge is particularly pronounced in 
peacebuilding. As peacebuilding interventions should be accountable to 
‘peace writ large’6, the attribution gap between the project level and the 
intended effects on the level of national peace becomes particularly wide and 
challenging for results measurement. Furthermore, data for relevant 
indicators to build baselines is seldom available and difficult to collect in 
conflict-affected contexts; projects are often adapted to respond to changes 
in the context, which challenges pre-post intervention comparisons. Finally, 
peacebuilding interventions aim to trigger change processes aiming at trans-
formations in very long timespans, which raises the question of whether these 
processes can be meaningfully assessed during (or shortly after) the inter-
vention itself.
 In a nutshell, the complexity of conflict-affected contexts and the 
necessary adaptation of programming are challenging the very basic founda-
tions of conventional ideas about accountability, the way we implement 
programs, structure the aid system, and ask questions about the success of 
our interventions. These challenges require specific approaches and strat-
egies in terms of results-orientation to grapple with the complexity of conflict-
affected contexts. Keywords like flexibility, a certain pragmatism, improved 
intervention design, and a focus on learning seem therefore to gain a high 
priority when thinking about peacebuilding results orientation. In the next 
section, current practice will be critically assessed from this perspective.
6 A claim already made 
 by Anderson and Olson (2003).
93.1 Challenges in understanding ‘the problem’ …
 
The Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP)7 demonstrated some time ago 
that effective interventions must be rooted in good conflict analysis. But the 
findings of the RPP Project equally show that current practice is far from ideal 
regarding conflict analysis: good conflict analyses are too rarely performed, 
and if they are, they are often not taken adequately into account in program 
design and strategy. While this problem was identified some time ago, a recent 
review by GIZ which was presented at the Bonn Workshop showed that it 
persists in today’s practice; a view that was also shared by the participants of 
the two workshops.
 Although there are several causes for this, one aspect in particular 
should be emphasized: a good conflict analysis should not only be understood 
as a prerequisite for programming, it should also be seen as a result in itself. 
Achieving a shared understanding of the key issues of conflict can turn out to 
be a challenging task given the differing perspectives and interpretations 
typically present in conflict-affected contexts, the lack of trust often found in 
conflict situations, and questions of access to marginalized groups in order to 
integrate their views. In addition, building up support among partners and 
other stakeholders for a strategy to address these key issues is even more 
difficult. It is therefore evident that analysis and design of a peacebuilding 
project cannot be reduced to a technocratic process that can be optimized 
with the appropriate methods. Rather, it is a political process, which is 
marked by different political positions and influenced by constraints beyond 
methodological problems.  
3.2 … in understanding ‘the solution’…
 
Besides understanding of the context, an understanding of how one’s own 
intervention is contributing to intended changes is often missing or not made 
explicit. Achieving positive change in complex, fast-changing, insecure 
environments is by no means a simple issue. In reality we can’t possibly know 
from the outset how to achieve such change in conflict-affected situations. In 
essence this means that we have to work on assumptions and not on facts 
about what works and how an intervention contributes to positive change.  
This means that the ‘black box’ between an intervention’s activities and its 
assumed results needs to be opened and made explicit. In today’s practice 
this is too often not the case. Goals and objectives in current logframes are 
often formulated in unrealistic and unspecific ways. Words like ‘reconciliation’ 
or ‘empowerment’ are often to be found in results frameworks, without any 
specification of what those ‘word shells’ actually mean in a given context,  
in what ways we think that the planned activities will contribute to such 
change, and what this has to do with addressing key issues of conflict. In  
other words, peacebuilding intervention design is still too often full of gaps 
and vagueness to such an extent that it makes many such interventions  
impossible to evaluate by professionals. 
7 See RPP website on: 
 http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/
 project_profile.php?pid=RPP&pname=
 Reflecting%20on%20Peace%20Practice 
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3.3 ... and in managing partner and power relations
The recently published reports about working successfully in conflict-affected 
environments8 stress the need for international actors to cooperate more 
among each other, to have legitimate and truly capacitated local actors in the 
lead, to have a clear strategic policy orientation to change key issues of 
fragility and conflict, and to be able to accept a higher risk of failure of their 
interventions. Looking at current practice one can’t fail to note a big gap 
regarding these good practice principles. 
 Still all too often, local actors are made to reply to international calls for 
proposals which put local actors into the role of an implementer instead of a 
real partner. Project durations are still insufficiently short (1-3 years’ planning 
horizons) in order to minimize risks and increase control for the funding 
agency. This results in a “hit and run peacebuilding” approach according to 
one presenter at the workshops; an approach that obviously cannot work. 
Funding designed to sustainably build the institutional capacities of national 
actors is still the exception, with the vast majority of funding being activity-
driven, forcing organizations to live from overheads.
 Few people would deny that a certain upward accountability is 
necessary; not least to provide information to funders on what has happened 
to their money. But if there is an excessive focus on upwards accountability, 
evaluations are often seen as a disempowering experience for local civil 
society organizations in which they are controlled by their funders. If that is 
the case, evaluations lose their learning function. At the workshops it was 
mentioned that “it takes two hands to clap”. But if one of the hands – the 
donor – is not committed to an evaluation in the sense of really and jointly 
learning what works and what doesn’t, then the other hand – the local organi-
zation – will always find ways to make a program look successful for the 
funder. This may even entail the pre-selection of interviewees who know what 
they have to say in order to make the program look successful and to ensure 
further funding of the activities. 
 Therefore, the relationship between the funding and the implementing 
partner organization is crucial. But if evaluation is understood in the way 
described in the workshops, as a “funding agency controlling a service 
deliverer” so that the funding agency can be accountable to the “tax payer” in 
the north, evaluation exercises will not contribute to an equal partnership. 
Therefore, the hierarchy in terms of power is often too much of a hindrance for 
really achieving meaningful results in conflict-affected contexts. Evaluations 
perceived as a top-down exercise of control do not encourage partner organi-
zations to be critical in what they report, and they certainly do not create the 
environment in which failures can be openly discussed. In current practice, 
such opportunities to learn are too often missed.
8  See, for instance, OECD (2007, 2011b);
  World Bank (2011).
11
9 Natsios (2010) saliently calls the  
tendency to count results as “obsessive 
measurement disorder”, which according 
to his analysis characterizes large parts 
 of international cooperation.
10  See also (OECD, 2011a).
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3.4 Organizational approaches to results measurement
As mentioned at the outset, organizations observe an increasing pressure to 
report on their results. Given the difficulties due to the context and the 
thematic working area, this begs the question of how institutions try to meet 
such requirements. Some patterns have been identified in the workshops, and 
some of them seem to have brought with them undesirable and adverse 
effects. On a general level, administrative demands and workload has 
increased overall as organizations have added additional instruments and 
reporting criteria. This has led to overburdening and too much technical 
baggage, particularly on the project level. Fuzzy objectives and an absence of 
Theories of Change have forced some organizations to increasingly report and 
focus again on outputs. Others invest increasing effort in measuring minor 
intermediate results such as  measuring to what level a training workshop has 
increased participants’ knowledge or skill level, or how the dialogue session 
has indeed changed individual participants’ perceptions. In other words, the 
measuring effort is spent on aspects and levels that should only be under-
stood as intermediate steps, and not as the overall change which a project 
aims to achieve.
 Perhaps most importantly organizational approaches to results 
measurement have in many instances become seriously tilted towards 
‘upward accountability’. This tendency means that there is less space 
available for ‘downward accountability’ or general learning about what works. 
The learning and accountability moments foreseen in standard Project Cycle 
Management (PCM) such as monitoring and evaluation have therefore become 
overburdened by data collection for upward accountability, ultimately to  
prove to donors that tangible value can be achieved for the money which they 
invested.9 This then prompts the following two questions: 1.) whose results  
(or results for whom) are we talking about when we say ‘results orientation’, 
and 2.) where and how do we actually learn in safe and self-critical ways when 
monitoring and evaluation are tweaked to serve predominantly upward 
accountability needs?
 Consequentially, many practitioners have stated that they don’t 
perceive current practice of accountability as appropriate for reaching its 
stated goal, namely to improve practice in terms of results. The findings of 
RPP and discussions at the two workshops illustrate this well: while practical 
steps to improve peacebuilding were outlined nearly a decade ago, many of 
them have still not found their way into practice. This is especially the case 
with regards to linking project design to the findings of conflict analysis. This 
crucial step is still far from being a standard. Current activities do not seem to 
encourage organizations to integrate previous lessons learned in their 
practice.10 Participants at the workshop agreed that this lack of learning is in 
itself a very costly thing.
12
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Making results-orientation
a meaningful endeavor:
entry points
The broader objective of results-orientation, namely to improve programming 
practice by going beyond outputs as a reference point for accountability, is 
generally acknowledged and agreed upon by practitioners. However, the 
challenges which results-orientation faces in conflict-affected contexts are 
manifold. In response to such challenges there exist different strategies which 
can, at least partially, overcome potential issues and ensure that results-
orientation is a constructive endeavor. This section outlines the concrete 
approaches taken by different organizations to highlight what can be done. 
4.1 Apply good practice minimal standards
 
In terms of methods for programming, the RPP findings - and especially the 
link between conflict analysis and project design - have to be emphasized.  
To put it bluntly, there is no way around doing a conflict analysis for effective 
working in conflict-affected contexts. Although this might be considered  
a very basic standard, experience shows that many interventions still lack 
adequate and updated conflict analyses in which to ground their project 
design. What sort of conflict analysis is performed can be adapted to the skills 
available and the needs of the project; of greater importance is to actually  
link the project design to the findings of the conflict analysis. For effective 
programming, the design phase is pivotal: if the project fails in terms of 
relevance because the design phase did not get enough attention, even the 
most sophisticated evaluation methodology won’t be able to show results 
achieved by the project.
4.2 Strengthen application of adapted methods
One approach could be the adoption of a new set of evaluation methods,  
which are better suited to dealing with the dynamic environment of conflict-
affected contexts. However, continuous, flexible adaptation of programming 
does have implications for other aspects of accountability practice. Conven-
tional approaches to evaluation – meaning in the first place experimental or 
quasi-experimental methods – rely on the comparison of a pre-intervention 
situation with the post-intervention situation. If the intervention logic is 
constantly and flexibly adapted according to changes in context, such 
comparisons are not feasible. There are other approaches to evaluation which 
can overcome this problem: approaches inspired by systemic thinking like 
developmental evaluation11 and outcome mapping12, or approaches relying 
more on an assessment of program theory like contribution analysis13; to cite 
just a few. But while these approaches are designed to deal with dynamic 
contexts, they cannot offer attribution of effects to a specific project. Even 
though ‘contribution’ seems to be a good enough alternative given the 
properties of conflict-affected contexts outlined above, there are concerns 
that these approaches might not be seen as convincing as methods focusing 
on attribution. When the general debate is mostly focusing on how to ground 
policy in evidence produced by ‘rigorous’ methods (e.g., randomized controlled 
trials), these alternative approaches do not seem to enjoy the same support by 
policy makers and donors as approaches promising more ‘rigor’.14 
11 See Patton (2011).
12 See Earl, Carden, and Smutylo (2001).
13 See Mayne (2001).
14 There is a lively debate around the pros 
and cons of randomized controlled trials 
(RCT): while RCTs are considered to be 
the ‘gold standard’ of impact assessment 
by some actors (for instance, see Center 
for Global Development, 2006), they have 
attracted a lot of criticism on the meth-
odological and applicability level (for in-
stance, see Scriven, 2008). As an example 
of these criticisms, Bamberger and White 
(2007) state that they are only applicable 
to a share of 5 percent of all development  
interventions. On the more general  
question of what evidence counts as  
credible evidence, see Donaldson,  
Christie, and Mark (2009).
13
15 Working with ToC has known an  
impressive upsurge in interest in the last 
years, and is recommended by a range  
of actors and authors as a way of  
grappling with complex environments.
16 See Davies and Dart (2005)
17 See Swiss Interchurch Aid HEKS (2011).
 As a concrete approach for project design, RPP proposes working with 
theories of change (ToC)15, which link the issues identified in the conflict 
analysis to concrete activities. The basic idea behind this approach is to make 
explicit the assumptions behind a project, i.e. how the proposed activities are 
thought to trigger the expected changes. Working with ToC aims to open up the 
black box between activities and impacts by specifying small steps that have 
to occur along the results chain if the project is to be successful.
 It is on these grounds that the monitoring system for the project is 
designed. The focus of monitoring activities is not whether outputs were 
delivered in a timely manner, but whether they have triggered the changes 
envisaged. By the (continuous) collection of evidence on the different pivotal 
points in the ToC, the organization gains a better understanding of how their 
project affects the context, and how it can be adapted and improved. This  
also helps to mitigate the problem that many projects aim to trigger change 
processes which take place over longer timeframes than usual project 
duration. Defining intermediate steps in the ToC provides indications of 
whether these larger processes are likely to take place, even if these contribu-
tions to ‘peace writ large’ cannot be observed during the project’s timeframe.
 While working with ToCs has increased in popularity in recent years  
with a wide range of organizations, other approaches are more marginal in 
use. Two approaches which were discussed in the course of the workshop 
address problems related to conventional approaches to DM&E caused by  
the complexity of conflict-affected contexts: most significant change and 
scenario planning.
 Most significant change (MSC) is a participatory monitoring approach  
in line with systemic thinking.16 Based on the assumption that complex 
environments cannot be fully understood and disentangled, MSC focuses on 
the perspective of change according to people on the ground. The method 
collects stories from participants in projects (and other stakeholders) about 
significant changes in their life in a specific time period, and selects the most 
significant changes – hence the name – in a discussion process. The purpose  
is to refine the idea of what changes are targeted by the project in question 
through the discussion process, but equally to identify unexpected changes  
in the environment. With questioning being detached from the specific project 
in the first place, MSC offers an approach of monitoring change in the broader 
context to guide program management in complex environments, and also  
to understand intermediate steps in a project’s ToC. Although integration  
into more conventional monitoring systems is challenging, experiences by  
organizations using MSC presented at the workshops are encouraging:17  
MSC was presented as a starting point for important reflections on an  
organization’s role in social change processes, and on different under-
standings of how change occurs. 
Making results-orientation a meaningful endeavor: entry points
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 Scenario planning is another way to adapt program management to the 
particularities of conflict-affected contexts. Rooted in strategic management, 
scenario planning aims at anticipating upcoming changes in the context in 
which a project is located, and to develop strategies to act accordingly. In the 
classic version of the approach, three scenarios - a best case, a worst case, 
and a most likely case - are developed along with strategic plans for each of 
the scenarios. While this method is closest to conventional approaches of 
management compared to the other approaches presented here, it offers a 
way of being prepared for situations that might come up, and it may also be an 
approach that is easier to ‘sell’ and explain, as it has been widely applied in 
for-profit-management.
4.3 Bring learning back into results-orientation
 procedures
The challenges of working in conflict-affected contexts cannot exclusively be 
addressed by better suited methods and tools. To make results-orientation a 
worthwhile effort, not only the tools, but also the institutional setting in which 
they are applied needs to be rethought. Processes of institutional learning 
need more attention, especially given that some lessons to improve practice 
have been known for some time but are not yet implemented as standard.  
In addition, as discussed above, current accountability practice is skewed 
towards control, instead of supporting learning processes which would 
contribute to a wider integration of these lessons.18
 The reasons for this might be manifold, but one aspect hampering the 
creation of more learning spaces has been repeatedly emphasized throughout 
the workshops: power hierarchies. Although most evaluations and similar 
accountability practices in the donor - implementer relationship emphasize 
that they should focus on learning instead of control, they are often perceived 
as the latter. Even if accountability practices are framed as oriented towards 
improving projects and learning, the power to provide, maintain, or cancel 
funding still resides with the donor organization. The creation of protected 
learning spaces where projects can be frankly discussed is in most cases 
hampered by this power imbalance.
 One proposition to deal with such power imbalances is peer reviews. 
The basic idea is simple: if typical evaluations prescribed by the account-
ability frameworks of donor organizations are perceived as control, organiza-
tions may be more open to being reviewed by peer organizations from another 
context that do not have direct stakes in the project. By decoupling learning 
from control, peer reviews aim at fostering a protected environment conducive 
to sincerely reflect an organization’s practice. In particular it is hoped that the 
problem of inflating results, or reserves towards learning from failure would 
be less pronounced in a peer-review process.
Making results-orientation a meaningful endeavor: entry points
18 See Campbell (2008).
15
 Peer reviews are not necessarily a panacea. As an approach, peer 
review is more of a way of circumventing the core problem rather than a 
method by which to address imbalances in power in the typical donor- 
implementer relationship. Peer Reviews are a well-known instrument for 
improving development practice. For the past 50 years bilateral donors have 
been regularly reviewed by their peer agencies in the framework of the  
OECD/DAC peer reviews. But to conduct peer reviews to improve programming 
practice in conflict-affected contexts has not been very common so far.  
There are a few experiences we can draw on when assessing their use and 
impact. The African Transitional Justice Research Network has piloted a peer 
learning initiative, where organizations peer reviewed similar organizations in 
other contexts. They concluded that peer learning is more likely to foster an 
environment where participants are open to receiving constructive criticism, 
compared to conventional evaluations19; a finding that was equally stressed  
in the discussions in the workshops. On the other hand, whether the lessons 
drawn from such processes are more likely to be actually used to improve 
practice, and what the role of such processes might be in relation to already 
existing accountability systems, has yet to be determined. In any case,  
the horizontal accountability promoted by peer reviews seems to offer an 
interesting complement to conventional upward accountability.
Making results-orientation a meaningful endeavor: entry points
19 See Mncwabe (2010).
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This working paper has shown that results-orientation in conflict-affected 
contexts is far from straightforward. Although the topic has attracted an 
impressive upsurge in interest, the complexity of highly dynamic environments 
constitute challenges that are not easily overcome, as they demand adapta-
tions that go beyond the introduction of a few new tools. What this paper  
has identified as key in developing a constructive way of handling results- 
orientation is the partner relationship between different organizations.  
In environments that are difficult to understand, let alone to predict, a partner-
ship fostering open exchange and learning is needed in order to effectively 
adapt to changing circumstances and to integrate lessons on the institutional 
level. In this regard, power relations between donor and implementing  
organizations are an important aspect and must be critically reflected upon.
 Some topics still require further exploration. While there are a number 
of entry points to address the challenges of conflict-affected contexts – for 
example, the application of different methods or a focus on institutional 
learning - their use is still marginal in the field. The pressure in terms of 
accountability seems still high to show quantifiable or ‘tangible’ results, even 
if this entails the application of a framework poorly adapted from another 
field, or the implementation of a blueprint solution detached from the local 
context. But if this pressure is perceived by all actors (including donors), and 
all actors express concern that they have to comply with this pressure, where 
does this pressure come from? And are there ways to re-frame the discourse 
on results-orientation in a way that is more constructive for practice?
 Furthermore, while power relations in international cooperation have 
been addressed in this paper in terms of a criticism to an excessive focus on 
upward accountability, and horizontal accountability in the form of peer 
reviews has been presented as a practical entry point to complement current 
accountability practice, the question of downward accountability has been 
conspicuously absent from the discussion. If we want to make results- 
orientation a constructive endeavor, possibilities to strengthen accountability 
towards local populations must also be further developed. Otherwise, 
programming in conflict-affected contexts still risks being detached from  
the realities of local populations.
 
5
Better results through 
results-orientation?
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